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Abstract
In this paper, we design a non-uniform static analysis for formally verifying
a protocol used in large-scale Grid systems for achieving delegations from
users to critical system services. The analysis reveals a few shortcomings
in the protocol, such as the lack of token integrity and the possibility of
repudiating a delegation session. It also reveals the vulnerability of non-
deterministic delegation chains that was detected as a result of adopting a
more precise analysis, which allows for more participants in the protocol than
did the original protocol designers envisage.
Keywords:
Delegation, Security, Protocol Verification, Static Analysis, Grid
1. Introduction
DToken is a lightweight delegation protocol [1] that has been recently
proposed as one solution for the problem of delegation from users to soft-
ware services and resources in large-scale Grid systems. Grid middleware
systems, such as Globus1 or GLite2, allow users to access the computational
and storage resources of the Grid. A typical model of Grids is often called
Virtual Organisations, which permits users from one organisation to access
and use resources belonging to another organisation under certain resource
sharing policies. However, such cross-organisational provisioning of resources
requires that critical issues of trust and security be managed. One issue is
releted to delegations performed by the user to the gateway, and within the
system on behalf of the user’s original delegation.
1www.globus.org
2glite.web.cern.ch
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Applying analysis techniques is one means by which critical services, such
as a delegation service, can be verified and validated against vulnerabilities
and incorrect usage therefore increasing the levels of confidence in the over-
all system functionality. In this paper, we apply formal analysis techniques
that we previously developed in [2, 3, 4, 5] to verify the DToken protocol
against certain core properties expected to hold in any robust delegation
protocol. We show, through our analysis, that properties like basic token
integrity validation, verifiable non-repudiation and deterministic delegation
chains actually do not hold in the protocol. Our non-uniform analysis allows
for different vulnerabilities to be discovered at different levels of abstraction.
Indeed, the lowest level of abstraction (i.e. the most precise analysis) demon-
strates a vulnerability, the lack of deterministic delegation chains, which was
overlooked in the original design of the protocol as a result of adopting too
abstract approaches.
In the rest of the paper, we give an overview of the DToken protocol in the
next Section 2 and discuss three essential properties that we expect to hold of
this protocol. In Section 3, we define the simple applied pi calculus language
and give its operational semantics. In Section 4, we define a non-standard
semantics that captures name substitutions as a result of communications,
and in Section 5, we introduce a computable approximation of this non-
standard semantics. In Section 6, we revisit the DToken protocol applying
our static analysis to it. Finally, in Section 8, we discuss related work and
in Section 9, we conclude the paper.
2. The Delegation Protocol
We give an overview here of the DToken delegation protocol as was defined
in [1]. The protocol comprises secure communications between a Delegator,
Dor, and a Delegatee, Dee. The following sequence of messages describes the
interactions in the protocol:
1. Dor→ Dee : CDor, CDee, Vfr, Vto, TS, PDor→Dee, DSDor→Dee0, SigDor→Dee
2. Dee→ Dor : CDor, CDee, Vfr, Vto, TS, PDor→Dee, DSDor→Dee, SigDor→Dee,
SigDee→Dor, CDorCAs
where,
CDor: Long-term public key identity certificate of Dor,
CDee: Long-term public key identity certificate of Dee,
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Vfr: The starting validity date of the delegation,
Vto: The expiry date of the delegation,
TS: A timestamp representing the time the message is generated,
PDor→Dee: The delegated permissions from Dor to Dee, which include the
delegation policies,
DSDor→Dee: A number representing the delegation session identifier,
DSDor→Dee0: Initial empty value of DSDor→Dee, which for simplicity is as-
sumed to be Null,
SigDor→Dee: The signature of the delegation information in the first message
signed by the private key of Dor, KDor, where
SigDor→Dee
def
= |{CDor, CDee, Vfr, Vto, TS, PDor→Dee, DSDor→Dee0}|KDor ,
SigDee→Dor: The signature of Dor’s signature in the first message signed by
the private key of Dee, KDee, where SigDee→Dor
def
= |{SigDor→Dee}|KDee , and
CDorCAs : The list of subordinate CAs linking CDor to the trusted root author-
ity.
There are a few points to note about the protocol as described in [1]. In
the first message, DSDor→Dee has an empty value, which we assume to be
some default value like Null. The choice of the delegatee’s decision to assign
the delegation session identifier rather than the delegator was not explained
by the designers of the protocol. Timestamps in both messages are neglected
in our analysis, as these are often non-reliable means of sequencing events in
distributed systems due to the problem of clock synchronisation.
The second message is referred to as the DToken (Delegation Token) from
Dor to Dee, written as DTDor→Dee, which represents the mutual delegation
agreement between Dor and Dee. In this message, Dee will update the value
for DSDor→Dee assigning it the current delegation session identifier. Further-
more, in between the two messages, Dee performs some verification tests to
ensure that Dor is authorised to delegate permissions to Dee and to ensure
that the security information Dor has sent in the first message is indeed valid.
For example, Dee will ensure that the certificates are valid and can be traced
up to the root of trust and that the token has not expired.
Another main assumption in the protocol is that all the communications
between Dor and Dee are carried over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)-based
channels [6]. This means that Dor and Dee are sure of each others identities
and the privacy of messages is guaranteed against external intruders. How-
ever, communication security does not imply that such external intruders
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cannot participate in the protocol like any other agents.
The protocol is claimed to form chains of delegation. Once the last del-
egatee in the delegation chain decides to stop delegating, it is assumed that
it will execute the delegated permissions, PDor→Dee, by applying them to a
Delegation Enforcement Point (DEP), typically a service or a resource. The
DEP will perform a couple of validation steps to check the integrity of the
DToken containing the permissions and other DTokens forming the full del-
egation chain. In [1], the authors give an example of a delegation chain in
Grid systems as shown in Figure 1.
CG, KG
Gateway G Job Queue System JQS
User 1. Mutual Authentication
3. Mutual Authentication
2. Generate DTU -> G
4. Pass DTU -> G
CU, KU
Trusted Machine TM: 
his own computer
0. Login
5. Generate DTG -> JQS
6. Mutual Authentication
7. Pass DTU -> G, DTG -> JQS
CFS, KFS
File System FS
CJQS, KJQS
Figure 1: DToken Chained Delegation through a Gateway (cited from [1, Figure 5]).
This chain consists of the user as the delegation root, who then delegates
some permissions to run a job to a gateway (a computer on which the user
can login). Then the gateway delegates the job to a job queueing system,
which itself is the end of the delegation chain. The job queueing system will
then execute the job on a file system (the DEP). One aspect of the com-
munication between the job queueing system and the file system is that the
DTokens generated in the previous communications are passed as a set. We
demonstrate later how this aspect introduces a vulnerability in the protocol.
2.1. Protocol Properties
The DToken protocol was designed to achieve lightweight delegation fo-
cusing on traceability of the participants rather than their privacy (in con-
trast to protocols such as [7]), therefore, it should sustain a few properties
related to its purposes and functionality.
2.1.1. DToken Integrity.
This property refers to the success of a DEP in validating the integrity of
a DToken. This implies that the two hash comparisons mentioned in Section
IV in [1] must always succeed.
Property [DToken Integrity Validation] A DToken is said to be valid if the
following equations are true:
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hash(CU , CG, Vfr, Vto, TS, PU→G, DSU→G) = decrypt(SigU→G, CU)
hash(SigU→G) = decrypt(SigG→U , CG) 
The first of these compares the hash of the delegation information to the
decryption of the signature of the delegator. The success of this validation
implies the consent of the delegator to the delegation. The second compares
the hash of the delegator’s signature with the decryption of the delegatee’s
signature. This second validation implies the consent of the delegatee to
the delegation. In general, the success of both comparisons ensures that the
DToken’s integrity is preserved.
2.1.2. Traceability and Accountability.
Traceability is defined in [1] as the ability of the delegatee to uniquely
identify the identity of any of the previous delegators. Accountability, on the
other hand, is verifiable traceability where such identity is cryptographically
identifiable. Accountability is also called non-repudiation. More specifically,
we define non-repudiation as the property that neither the delegator nor the
delegatee can deny their acceptance of the delegation at the point of per-
mission execution. This implies further that the delegatee must not be able
to use the delegated permissions before at least having signed the DToken
containing those permissions initiated by the delegator.
Formally, we define the property of verifiable non-repudiation as follows,
assuming Perms is the set of all permission.
Property [Verifiable Non-repudiation] Given a delegator, Dor, and a delegatee,
Dee, then we say that neither can deny the delegation if the following is true:
∀PDor→Dee ∈ Perms : use(Dee, PDor→Dee)⇒
(signed(Dee,PDor→Dee) ∧ signed(Dor,PDor→Dee)) 
This property says that it must hold that each time a delegatee uses
some permissions, then those permissions must have been signed by both the
delegator and the delegatee.
2.1.3. Deterministic Delegation Chains.
The property of deterministic delegation chains implies the ability of de-
termining the delegation chain ending at a DEP based on the set of DTokens
received by that DEP. The property is deterministic since the delegation
chain consists of a single trace of delegation events.
In order to formalise this property, we first need to establish what is
meant by a delegation chain according to the DToken protocol, assuming
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Agents is the set of all possible agents that can participate in the protocol.
Definition[Delegation Chains] Given a set of DTokens, DTset ∈ DTokens,
then we define the set of all DToken chains, DTchain, that can be constructed
from DTset as follows:
DTchain = {dc | (set(dc) = DTset) ∧ (∀a, b ∈ dc, ∃Dor,Dee ∈ Agents : (a =
head(dc)) ∧ (b = tail(dc)) ∧ (b 6= [ ]) ∧ (a = DTDor→Dee) ⇒ (∃H ∈ Agents :
b = DTDee→H))} 
According to this definition, a chain, dc, is essentially a list of DTokens
whose underlying set is DTset and whose adjacent elements have common
adjacent participating agents. Now, we can define the property of determin-
istic delegation chains as follows.
Property [Deterministic Delegation Chains] Given a set of DTokens, DTset,
then a deterministic delegation chain implies that |DTchain| = 1. 
If however, |DTchain| > 1, then a DEP validating the delegation path
from a specific root delegator will not be able to determine the exact chain
of delegations leading to itself.
3. The Simple Applied Pi Calculus
The language that we adopt in the analysis to follow is a simple version of
the applied pi calculus [8] as is shown in the syntax of Figure 2. This syntax
L,M,N, T, U, V ∈ T ::= Terms
a, b, c, n,m ∈ N Names
x, y, z ∈ V Variables
f(M1, . . . ,Mn) Function application
P,Q,R ∈ P ::= Processes
0 Null process
P | Q Parallel composition
P +Q Non-deterministic Choice
!P Replication
(νn)P Name restriction
if M = N then P else Q Conditional
M(x).P Input
M〈N〉.P Output
Figure 2: The syntax of the applied pi calculus.
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is described briefly as follows. Terms consist of names, which are constant
values, and variables, which are names that can be instantiated to other
terms. A term can also be complex as a result of the application of a function,
f(M1, . . . ,Mn), to other terms, M1, . . . ,Mn. We assume that functions are
taken from a finite signature, Ξ, equipped with an equational theory used to
infer when two terms are equal, Ξ ` M = L. For example, the symmetric-
key decryption equation is written as Ξ ` decrypt(encrypt(x, y), y) = x and
digital signature verification is written as Ξ ` decrypt(sig(x,K), C) = x,
where C is the public certificate corresponding the private key K and x is
the hash of some message. We assume by default that Ξ `M = M .
Using terms, processes are built according to the following syntax. A
null process, 0, is an inactive process. A parallel composition of two pro-
cesses, P | Q, allows P and Q to interact by interleaving, whereas the non-
deterministic choice, P + Q, allows either P or Q to be chosen and the
other is discarded. The replication of a process creates as many copies of
the process as required by the context. The restriction of a name, (νn)P ,
creates a fresh name n bounded to the scope of P . The conditional process,
if M = N then P else Q, allows two terms to be compared under Ξ and if
equal, then P is chosen, else Q. Finally, M(x).P and M〈N〉.P represent
standard input and output actions. We shall omit trailing 0s as residues of
actions and write for example, M(x), instead of M(x).0
We assume that the usual notions of free and bound names and free and
bound variables (referred to as fn, bn, fv, bv, respectively) apply as usual to
terms and processes. We refer to the combined set of bound names and
variables for any process or a term, e, as bnv(e) = bn(e) ∪ bv(e), and the
combined set of free names and variables of e as fnv(e) = fn(e) ∪ fv(e). In
what follows, we only consider standard processes.
Property [Standard Processes] For any process, P ∈ P , we say P is standard
if and only if:
1. there are no occurrences of homonymous bound names and variables,
such as for example, a(x).P | b(x).Q, or νn.A | νn.B,
2. ∀s, s′ ∈ {bn(P ), fn(P ), bv(P ), fv(P )} : s ∩ s′ = {},
3. all standard processes are closed processes, i.e. fv(P ) = {}, and finally,
4. in the following processes, M(x).P , M〈N〉.P and if M = M ′ then P else Q,
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then M and M ′ are either names or variables that are instantiated to
names.

Renaming of bound names and variables, called α-conversion, can be
used to initially achieve points [1.] and [2.]. On the other hand, [3.] allows
us to avoid open systems and [4.] prevents constructing channel names or
comparing terms that are complex.
The structural operational semantics of our simple applied pi calculus is
defined in terms of the structural congruence (≡) relation, shown in Figure 3,
and the reaction (
τ−→) relation as shown in Figure 4. The rules of Figure 3
Par-0 P ≡ P | 0
Par-A P | (Q | R) ≡ (P | Q) | R
Par-C P | Q ≡ Q | P
Choice-C P +Q ≡ Q+ P
Repl !P ≡ P | !P
New-0 νa.0 ≡ 0
New-C νa.νb.P ≡ νb.νa.P
New-Par P | νa.Q ≡ νa.(P | Q) when a /∈ fnv(P )
Eqn-Out a〈M〉.P ≡ a〈N〉.P such that Ξ ` M = N
Figure 3: Rules of the structural congruence relation, ≡.
Comm a〈M〉.P | a(x).Q τ−→ P | Q[M/x]
Then if M = N then P else Q
τ−→ P such that Ξ ` M = N
Else if M = N then P else Q
τ−→ Q such that Ξ 0 M = N
Choice P
τ−→ P ′ ⇒ P +Q τ−→ P ′
Struct P ≡ Q ∧ P τ−→ P ′ ∧ P ′ ≡ Q′ ⇒ Q τ−→Q′
Figure 4: Rules of the reaction relation,
τ−→.
express how processes may change their shape in a commutative way. On the
other hand, the rules of Figure 4 define process evolution in a non-reversible
(non-commutative) manner.
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4. A Name-Substitution Semantics
In this section, we define a non-standard semantics for the language of the
previous section in which it is possible to express the meaning of processes
in terms of name substitutions resulting from message passing only (we ex-
plicitly exclude other substitutions, such as those due to α-conversions). For
example, consider the process,
!((νa)b〈a〉) | !b(x)
then we would like to have a meaning that captures the set of substitutions,
[a1/x1], [a2/x2] etc., where ai is a labelled
3 copy of the fresh name, a, and xi
is a labeled instance of the input variable x. The semantic meaning that we
introduce to capture name substitutions is the environment, φS : V → ℘(T ),
such that L ∈ φS(x) implies that the term L replaces the input parameter,
x, at runtime. From φS , a concrete semantic domain, D⊥ : V → ℘(T ), is
formed with the following ordering:
∀φS1, φS2 ∈ D⊥ : φS1 vD⊥ φS2 ⇔ ∀x ∈ V : φS1(x) ⊆ φS2(x)
where the bottom element, ⊥, denotes the empty environment, φS0, which
maps every variable in V to {}. The special union of φS environments, ∪φS ,
is defined as follows:
∀x ∈ V : (φS1 ∪φS φS2)(x) = φS1(x) ∪ φS2(x)
From the above definition of D⊥, we can assign a meaning to process P as
a function S([P ]) ρ φS ∈ D⊥, defined inductively over the structure of P by
the rules of Figure 5, where ρ is a multiset representing processes running in
parallel with P and φS is the current value of φS prior to the interpretation
of P .
The two multiset operators, singleton {| − |} : P → ℘(P) and multiset
union unionmulti : ℘(P)× ℘(P)→ ℘(P), are defined in the standard manner over ρ.
The interpretation of the contents of ρ is given in rule (R0) using ∪φS over
the meaning of every process P in ρ.
We describe next informally each of the name-substitution semantic rules,
(S1) to (S7). In (S1), input actions are interpreted for each of the two
following possibilities:
3Other labeling schemes can be used provided they maintain the uniqueness of bound
names and variables and can cope with their infinite number.
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(R0) R([ρ]) φS =
⋃
φS
P∈ρ
S([P ]) (ρ\{|P |}) φS
(S1) S([N(x).P ]) ρ φS =
(
⋃
φS
N ′〈M〉.P ′∈ρ
R([ρ\{|N ′〈M〉.P ′|} unionmulti {|P |} unionmulti {[P ′]}]) φS [y 7→ (φS(y) ∪ {M})]) ∪φS φS
where, N
φS∼ N ′
(S2) S([N〈M〉.P ]) ρ φS = φS
(S3) S([P | Q]) ρ φS = R([{|P |} unionmulti {|Q|} unionmulti ρ]) φS
(S4) S([P +Q]) ρ φS = R([{|P |} unionmulti ρ]) φS ∪φS R([{|Q|} unionmulti ρ]) φS
(S5) S([if M = N then P else Q]) ρ φS =
{
R([{|P |} unionmulti ρ]) φS if M φS∼ N
R([{|Q|} unionmulti ρ]) φS otherwise
(S6) S([!P ]) ρ φS = snd(fix F(1,⊥))
where, F = λfλ(j, φ).f (if φ = R([(
j⊎
i=0
{|Pσi|}) unionmulti ρ]) φS then j, φ else
(j + 1), (R([(
j⊎
i=0
{|Pσi|}) unionmulti ρ]) φS))
and, σi
def
= [bnv i(P )/bnv(P )] and bnv i(P ) = {xi | x ∈ bnv(P )}
(S7) S([(νn)P ]) ρ φS = R([{|P |} unionmulti ρ]) φS
(S8) S([0]) ρ φS = φS
Figure 5: The definition of S([P ]) ρ φS .
• The case of communications with matching output actions in ρ: In this
case, the rule uses the equivalence of two terms,
φS∼, parameterised by
φS to determine matching channel names. This is defined as follows:
M
φS∼ N ⇔ ({a : a ∈ N ∧ a ∈ φS(M)} ∪ {M}) ∩ ({b : b ∈ N ∧ b ∈
φS(N)} ∪ {N}) 6= ∅
The definition considers the cases whereM orN are variables by search-
ing for all the names in their φS values, and also for the cases where
they may be names, by adding themselves to their value sets. A non-
empty intersection of the two value sets then implies common channel
names. For example, if M = x ∈ V , N = a ∈ N and φS(x) = {a, b, c},
then we have that ({a, b, c} ∪ {x}) ∩ ({} ∪ {a}) = {a}, which implies
that M
φS∼ N . For each synchronisation between N(x) and a matching
N ′〈M〉, the value of φS is updated with the resulting substitution. The
resulting ρ is also updated with the residues of the input and output
actions.
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• The case of no communications: In this case, no communication is
assumed to take place and the same initial φS is left unaffected.
The next rule, (S2), considers the case of output actions, which are inter-
preted as having no effect on φS since communications are taken care of in
rule (S1). In rule, (S3), parallel composition of two processes is interpreted
straightforwardly by joining the two processes to ρ. Rule (S4) deals with
the non-deterministic choice of two processes by interpreting both choices
separately and then joining the results. Rule (S5) considers conditional pro-
cesses, where M
φS∼ N is used to compare M to N . Rule (S6) deals with
replicated processes using a fixed-point calculation of the higher order func-
tional, F , with a fixed-point fixF = FF . The rule allows for as many copies
of P to be spawned and the number of each copy is used to subscript its
bounded names and variables in order to maintain their uniqueness. This
renaming is achieved through applying the σi substitution parameterised by
the number of the process copy. Rule (S7) removes the new name operator
on restrictions, (νn)P , thanks to the fact that the interpretation of repli-
cated processes (in rule (S6)) maintains the uniqueness of bound names and
variables ([1.] in Property 3). Finally, rule (S8) interprets the null process
as having no effect on φS .
The following soundness theorem states that any name substitutions in
the structural operational semantics are captured in the non-standard se-
mantics.
Theorem[Soundness of the non-standard semantics]
∀P,Q,M, y : P τ−→∗ Q[M/y] ⇔ M ∈ φ′S(y) where, φ′S = S([P ]) ρ φS0
Proof sketch. The proof is by induction on the rules of the structural op-
erational semantics in Figures 3 and 4 and the rules of the non-standard
semantics in Figure 5. The most interesting case is for rule (S1), which we
can show that substitutions captured in that rule correspond to communica-
tions occurring in rule Comm. 
5. An Approximated Semantics
The computation of the name substitution semantics of the previous sec-
tion may lead to infinite sizes of D⊥ as a result of the presence of infinitely-
bounded replication in processes. Hence, it may be the case that the number
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of instances of bound names and variables needs to be restricted to a finite
number that would maintain a finite size of the semantic domain. Therefore,
we introduce αm, an approximation function, which limits the number of
copies of bounded names and variables to an upper limit of m ∈ N copies.
This approximation function is defined as follows.
Definition[The αm approximation] Define αm : (N ∪ V) → (N ] ∪ V]) as
follows, where N ] = N\{ai | i > m} and V] = V\{xi | i > m}:
∀u ∈ (N ∪ V) : αm(u) =
{
um, if u = ui ∧ i > m
u, otherwise

We shall write αm({u, u′, . . .}) to mean {αm(u), αm(u′), . . .}. The selec-
tion of m will determine how precise the analysis is. The higher the value
of m, the more precise it is. In the extreme case of m = ∞, the semantics
converges to the case of the concrete semantics of the previous section. On
the contrary, selecting m = 1 results in a linear analysis in which all copies
of bound names and variables are identified with one another. In most cases,
trial and error will lead to some value probably in between the two extremes.
The αm approximation function leads naturally to the appearance of the
abstract environment, φA : V] → ℘(N ]) and the abstract domain, D]⊥, or-
dered as follows:
∀φA1, φA2 ∈ D]⊥ : φA1 vD]⊥ φA2 ⇔ ∀x ∈ V
] : φA1(x) ⊆ φA2(x)
with the expected definitions for φA0 and ∪φA . Based on D]⊥, we can interpret
processes using the approximated semantic function, Aαm([P ]) ρ φA ∈ D]⊥,
defined as:
Aαm([P ]) ρ φA def= let σi = σαm in let φS = φA in S([P ]) ρ φS
which uses the same algorithm for S([P ]) ρ φS defined in Figure 5 but replac-
ing φS and σi with their abstract counterparts. The σαm operator is defined
for all P as follows:
σαm
def
= [αm(bnvi(P ))/bnv(P )]
Let’s consider next an example of how this approximation is used.
Example Consider the replicated process,
(!(νK)a(x).b〈enc(x,K)〉) | a〈msg〉.!(b(y).a〈y〉)
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Then the concrete semantics of this process according to the rules of Figure
5 would yield the following infinite environment:
φS [x1 7→ {msg}, x2 7→ {y1}, x3 7→ {y2}, . . . ,
y1 7→ {enc(x1, K1)}, y2 7→ {enc(x2), K2)}, y3 7→ {enc(x3, K3)}, . . .]
Now, assuming an approximation function α1, we obtain the following linear
analysis:
φA[x1 7→ {msg, y1}, y1 7→ {enc(x1, K1)}]
which shows that msg is protected by encryption using the key K. On the
other hand, selecting α2 will result in the following non-linear analysis:
φA[x1 7→ {msg}, x2 7→ {y1, y2}, y1 7→ {enc(x1, K1)}, y2 7→ {enc(x2), K2)}}]
This result, though, provides better information in that it demonstrates that
the process generates higher-order encryptions (encryptions of encryptions),
in this case more robust than single encryptions since new fresh keys are used
for each encryption. 
Finally, the following termination result can be shown to hold.
Theorem[Termination of the abstract semantics] For any process, P ,
the computation of A([P ]) {||} ⊥D]⊥ terminates.
Proof sketch. The proof relies on two requirements: First, to show that
D]⊥ is finite. This is true from the definition of αm. The second is to show
that the abstract meaning of a process is monotonic with respect to the num-
ber of copies of a replicated process:
R([(
j⊎
i=0
{|Pσαm |}) unionmulti ρ]) φA vD]⊥ R([(
j+1⊎
i=0
{|Pσαm|}) unionmulti ρ]) φA
This latter requirement is proved by showing that the extra copy of P can
only induce more communications and not less, which will be ultimately
bounded by αm. This can be shown by considering every case of P in the
abstract version of the semantics of Figure 5. From this semantics, we can
see that the only rule affecting the value of φA will be rule (S1), which only
adds elements to φA rather than removing ones. 
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6. Revisiting the DToken Protocol
Naturally, the definition of any security protocol written in the informal
Alice/Bob notation leaves the protocol under-specified with regards to the
intermediate steps that the participants in the protocol perform. This applies
to the case of the DToken protocol of Section sect:protocol and to its informal
specification given by its designers in [1]. Therefore, one immediate benefit
resulting from the modelling of the protocol in a formal language (such as
the simple applied pi calculus) is that it leads to the removal of any under-
specification or ambiguity of behaviour in the protocol.
The formal model of the DToken delegation protocol that we provide here
is shown in Figure 6.
Protocol
def
=
1 (!(νA)cprotocol〈A〉) |
2 (cprotocol(z1) . . . cprotocol(zn).cAgent〈(z1, . . . , zn)〉 . . . cAgent〈(zn, z1 . . . , z[n− 1])〉) |
3 Agent | DEP
Agent
def
=
4 !(νcfdb)(cAgent(myName, xagent2, . . . , xagentn).cfdb〈{}〉 |
5 !(νcDorS)(νcDeeS)cfdb(xknowledge).(
6 (
n
Σ
i=1
cDorS〈xagenti〉 | Dor) + (myName〈cDeeS〉 | Dee) + Π
dt∈xknowledge
cDEP〈dt〉))
Dor
def
=
7 cDorS(deeName).deeName(deeSC).deeSC〈(myName, cDorS, xknowledge)〉.
8 deeSC〈(Crt(myName),Crt(deeName), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName, deeName),Null,
9 sig(Crt(myName),Crt(deeName), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName, deeName),Null,
10 K(myName)))〉.cDorS(xdtoken).cfdb〈∪(xdtoken, xknowledge)〉
Dee
def
=
11 (νDSDorDee)(νcintern)cDeeS(dorName, dorSC, yknowledge).
12 (cDeeS(y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, ydorSig).
13 (cintern〈decrypt(ydorSig,Crt(dorName))〉 | cintern(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7).
14 (cintern〈(y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee, ydorSig, sig(ydorSig,K(myName)),CrtChain(dorName))〉 |
15 cintern(ydtoken).(dorSC〈ydtoken〉 | cfdb〈∪(ydtoken, yknowledge)〉))))
DEP
def
=
16 !(νcDEPint)(cDEP(w).(cDEPint〈w〉 | cDEPint(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10).
17 (cDEPint〈hash(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7)〉.cDEPint〈hash(w8)〉.
18 cDEPint〈decrypt(w9, w2)〉.cDEPint〈decrypt(w8, w1)〉 |
19 cDEPint(w11).cDEPint(w12).cDEPint(w13).cDEPint(w14).
20 (if w12 = w13 then (if w11 = w14 then cDEPint〈OK〉 else cDEPint〈ER2〉) else cDEPint〈ER1〉 |
21 cDEPint(w15)))))
Figure 6: The definition of the DToken protocol in the simple applied pi calculus.
In this model, lines 1-3 describe the main protocol where n ∈ N number
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of agents is generated. These are then transmitted to instances of the Agent
process, where each instance gets the names of all the agents. The ordering
of the names in the output message is such that the first name represents the
recipient’s own name, whereas the others represents names of other agents in
the system. This is altered for each instance such that each Agent instance
gets a different own name from the others. Although we left n as a general
number, we emphasize here that for delegation to be interesting (more than
self-delegation), at least two different agents must be present and hence,
n ≥ 2.
Lines 4-6 describe an agent process. This process receives its name and
the name of the other agents in the system. It then spawns an agent in line 4
by outputting a signal with empty knowledge on cfdb. In line 5, the new agent
is created and in line 6, it chooses one of three possible behaviours: to run as
a delegator process (Dor), a delegatee process (Dee) or to apply the permis-
sions it has in its knowledge to the DEP process (DEP). We have used the
special operators, Σ and Π, as concise forms of the non-deterministic choice
and the parallel composition of several processes, respectively. Additionally,
we used in lines 10 and 15 the ∪(e, s) operator to represent the union of
element e to set s.
Lines 7-10 describe the delegator process and lines 11-15 describe the
delegatee process. At the end of each of these process, the accumulated
knowledge of the current set of DTokens, represented by the xknowledge and
yknowledge variables, along with the newly generated DToken in variables xdtoken
and ydtoken is returned back to a new instance of the Agent process. Finally,
the DEP process in lines 16-21 receives any number of DTokens and attempts
to validate their integrity by comparing hashes of the delegated and signed
information. These validation steps were defined in [1] as the main verifica-
tion of DTokens. If the two tests are successful, the process sends an OK
signal. Otherwise, it will send either ER1 or ER2 depending on where the
validation failure occurred.
6.1. The Abstract Interpretation of the Protocol
We carried out an abstract interpretation of the DToken protocol by
applying the abstract semantic function, Aαm([Protocol]) {||} ⊥, on the model
of the protocol as defined in the previous section and for the approximation
cases of α1, α2, α3 and α4.
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6.1.1. The Case of α1.
This case does not make much sense for a delegation protocol since it
identifies all agents in the model. This has the effect of having multiple
instances of the same agent, who will be able to only delegate permissions
to itself (i.e. it will assume the roles of Dor and Dee at the same time).
Therefore, we ignore this case as it does not give us much insight into the
protocol.
6.1.2. The Case of α2.
This case differentiates two agents, and we consider the interesting case
where one of them assumes the role of the delegator and the other the role
of the delegatee (i.e. one chooses to run Dor and the other Dee). This case
corresponds to single-level delegation between two agents, where some of the
results of the abstract interpretation using Aα2([Protocol]) {||} ⊥ are shown in
Figure 7.
φA[ w11 7→ {y12}, w21 7→ {y22}, w31 7→ {y32}, w41 7→ {y42}, w51 7→ {y52}, w61 7→ {y62},
w71 7→ {DSDorDee2}, w81 7→ {ydorSig2}, w111 7→ {hash(w11, w21, w31, w41, w51, w61, w71)},
w141 7→ {decrypt(w81, w11)}, w151 7→ {ER2}
y12 7→ {Crt(myName1)}, y22 7→ {Crt(deeName1)}, y32 7→ {Vfr}, y42 7→ {Vto}
y52 7→ {TS}, y62 7→ {Prm(myName1, deeName1)}, y72 7→ {Null}
ydorSig2 7→ {sig(Crt(myName1),Crt(deeName1), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName1, deeName1),
Null,K(myName1))}
deeName1 7→ {xagent21}, xagent21 7→ {z2}, z2 7→ {A2},myName1 7→ {z1}, z1 7→ {A1} . . .]
Figure 7: Some of the results for the case of α2.
Vulnerability 1 (Non-matching Hash Validation.). The main result one
notices is that w151 catches an error message ER2. If we examine the spec-
ification of Figure 6, we find that this error message is due to the fact that
w111 6= w141. Applying the results of φA to this equation to resolve its vari-
ables, we arrive at the following implications:
w11 6= w14
⇒ hash(w11, w21, w31, w41, w51, w61, w71) 6= decrypt(w81, w11)
⇒ hash(y12, y22, y32, y42, y52, y62,DSDorDee2) 6= decrypt(ydorSig2, y12)
⇒ hash(Crt(myName1),Crt(deeName1), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName1, deeName1),
DSDorDee2) 6=
decrypt(sig(Crt(myName1),Crt(deeName1), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName1, deeName1),
Null, K(myName1)),Crt(myName1))
⇒ hash(Crt(myName1),Crt(deeName1), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName1, deeName1),
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DSDorDee2) 6=
hash(Crt(myName1),Crt(deeName1), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName1, deeName1),Null)
⇒ DSDorDee2 6= Null 
This result implies an incorrect validation of the DToken, which is caused
by the fact that the delegator (Dor) agent always signs a Null value for the
delegation session identifier. This is later assigned by the delegatee (Dee)
the value of DSDorDee. In the protocol of Section 2, this is due to the fact
that the value of DSU→G is different in the two messages, or in other words,
there is a lack of agreement between the delegator and the delegatee on the
delegation session identifier as they both sign different values.
The significance of this result is that it further undermines the claims in
[1] of the ability of the DEP to validate the integrity property of any DTokens
it receives and further brings in to question some of the evaluation results
presented for the case of chained delegations, since any such chains could not
possibly have been successfully validated since the first DToken validation
will always fail.
Fixing the Vulnerability.. One suggestion to fix this vulnerability is to simply
allow the delegator to choose the session identifier instead of the delegatee.
In this way, the delegator will agree on the same value with the delegatee.
6.1.3. The Case of α3.
This case corresponds to a two-level delegation with three agents. The
most interesting case here is where two agents play the normal roles of the
delegator and the delegatee, and the third agent plays a man-in-the-middle
role, which means that the agent in addition to being able to run the nor-
mal protocol behaviour, can also run any extra behaviour that may subvert
the protocol. Therefore, any “robust” protocol is expected to be able to
withstand such subversive behaviour.
Since we start from the assumption that one agent is the man-in-the-
middle intruder, we replace line 15 by the following new line of code for the
delegatee process and assume that the malicious agent (only) will run this
new version:
15. cintern(ydtoken).(dorSC〈ydtoken〉 | cfdb〈∪(ydtoken, yknowledge)〉 +
DeeMiM))))
where DeeMiM is the extra man-in-the-middle code defined as follows:
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DeeMiM
def
= cDEP〈(Crt(myName), y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee,
sig(Crt(myName), y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee, K(myName)),
sig(sig(Crt(myName), y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee, K(myName)), K(myName)),
CrtChain(myName))〉
This extra behaviour simply takes the permissions y6 received from the del-
egator as well as the other delegation information such as the time validity
etc., and builds a new, but dummy, DToken. This dummy DToken is per-
fectly syntactically valid and it expresses self-delegation from the delegatee
to itself. The delegatee then sends this DToken to the DEP in order to use
the permissions that it received in reality from the delegator. The DEP will
successfully validate the token as it is syntactically correct and will assume
that the delegatee has delegated the permissions to itself.
Applying our abstract interpretation using Aα2([Protocol]) {||} ⊥ to the
protocol enhanced with the above new man-in-the-middle definition of Dee,
we arrive at the results of Figure 8.
φA[
w11 7→ {y12,Crt(myName2)}, w21 7→ {y22}, w31 7→ {y32}, w41 7→ {y42}, w51 7→ {y52},
w61 7→ {y62},
w71 7→ {DSDorDee2}, w81 7→ {ydorSig2, sig(Crt(myName2), y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee2 ,K(myName2))},
w91 7→ {sig(ydorSig2,K(myName2)),
sig(sig(Crt(myName2), y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee2 ,K(myName2)),K(myName2))},
w101 7→ {CrtChain(dorName2),CrtChain(myName2)},
w111 7→ {hash(w11, w21, w31, w41, w51, w61, w71)},
w141 7→ {decrypt(w81, w11)}, w151 7→ {ER2}
y12 7→ {Crt(myName1)}, y22 7→ {Crt(deeName1)}, y32 7→ {Vfr}, y42 7→ {Vto}
y52 7→ {TS}, y62 7→ {Prm(myName1, deeName1)}, y72 7→ {Null}
ydorSig2 7→ {sig(Crt(myName1),Crt(deeName1), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(myName1, deeName1),
Null,K(myName1))}
deeName1 7→ {xagent21}, xagent21 7→ {z2}, z2 7→ {A2},myName1 7→ {z1}, z1 7→ {A1},
myName2 7→ {z2} . . .]
Figure 8: Some of the results for the case of α3.
Vulnerability 2 (Delegation Repudiation.). Going back to the property
of verifiable non-repudiation defined in Section 2.1 and assuming that φA is
as defined in Figure 8, then we provide the following definitions of the use
and signed predicates for any i, j, k ∈ N numbers, where k < j, and any two
agents A1 and A2:
U
def
= A1,G
def
= A2, PU→G
def
= Prm(A1, A2),
use(G,PU→G)
def
= PU→G ∈ φA(w6i),
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signed(G,PU→G)
def
= ∃dt ∈ wi :
dt = (Crt(U),Crt(G), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(U,G),DSU→G, SigU→G, sig(SigU→G, K(G)),
CrtChain(U)) ∧ y6j = Prm(U,G),
signed(U ,PU→G)
def
= ∃dt ∈ wi :
dt = (Crt(U),Crt(G), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(U,G),DSU→G, SigU→G, sig(SigU→G, K(G)),
CrtChain(U)) ∧ y6j = Prm(U,G) ∧
SigU→G = sig(Crt(U),Crt(G), Vfr, Vto,TS,Prm(U,G),Null, K(U))
then we find that the property does not always hold, since if we choose w91
to be:
sig(sig(Crt(myName2), y2, y3, y4, y5, y6,DSDorDee2 , K(myName2)), K(myName2))
then we can show, after applying the full substitutions of variables in φA, that
use(A2,Prm(A1, A2)) = T and signed(A2,Prm(A1, A2)) = F. 
This implies that the delegatee is able to use the permissions without having
to sign a DToken proving that it got those permissions from the delegator.
The main reason behind this vulnerability is that the delegatee receives these
permissions prematurely from the delegator, therefore, it is able to subvert
its part on signing the DToken. These results are equivalent to replacing
Message 2 in the original protocol by the message:
2′.G→ DEP : CG, CG, Vfr, Vto, TS, PU→G, DSU→G, SigG→G, |{SigG→G}|KG , CGCAs
This message allows G to create a dummy DToken in order to use the per-
missions it received from the user U . One argument against the validity of
such a vulnerability is that the local policies at the DEP should be able to
prevent G from using PU→G. However, we consider this argument to be weak
as it associates the robustness of the protocol with the expressivity of the
DEP policies. There are simply no guarantees that the DEP will enforce
such policies, specifically in scenarios where the anonymity of the agents is
required or where the DEP is a stateless Web service.
Fixing the Vulnerability.. The fix to this vulnerability requires the modifi-
cation of the protocol and the introduction of extra steps. The delegator
should only send the permissions to the delegatee after the latter has agreed
(by signing the delegation information) to participate in the delegation ses-
sion. In this way, the delegatee has no means of denying its participation in
the protocol. Also, a monitoring service should be introduced to the archi-
tecture to record the signatures and provide evidence whenever required.
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6.1.4. The Case of α4.
This case is an interesting one since it did not feature in the design of the
DToken protocol presented in [1] and it assumes the presence of four agents,
two of which are playing men-in-the-middle roles. The original protocol of
[1] assumes in several occasions4 that the protocol is indeed able to form
deterministic delegation chains. This is true in the specific case where the
number of participating agents is less than or equal three. However, in the
case of four agents, the possibility of internal circular delegations arises. In
order to explain this, consider the following example.
Example Assume agents A, B, C and D with the following scenario of dele-
gation: A delegates to B, B delegates to C, C delegates to A, A delegates to
C and C delegates to D. This scenario results in D receiving the following
set of DTokens: {DTA→B,DTB→C ,DTC→A,DTA→C ,DTC→D}
However, due to the presence of the delegation cycle - C delegates to A and
A delegates to C-, D is able to form the following chain using the same set of
tokens: A delegates to C, C delegates to A, A delegates to B, B delegates to
C and C delegates to D. This is clearly different chain from the actual one
above. The implication of this is that D will not be able to determine the
exact set of delegations leading to itself. Since delegation is a form of trust,
this problem breaks the trust chain and does not preserve the deterministic
delegation chain property of Section 2. 
Applying our analysis for α4 along the lines of this example, where there
are four agents A1, A2, A3 and A4, we were able to show that |DTchain| > 1
assuming that the underlying set is xknowledge. Our analysis does not capture
temporal ordering of messages based on DToken timestamps (TS ) since we
consider that timestamps in a large-scale distributed system with several
possibly non-synchronised clocks are a bad mechanism for imposing temporal
ordering on events.
Fixing the Vulnerability.. This vulnerability arises from the fact that Dtokens
are passed as a set. A set has no notion of ordering or indeed multiplicity.
A richer structure, like lists, is needed when grouping and passing DTokens,
such that some reasoning on their temporal ordering can be achieved.
4See, for example, Verification 3 of page 7 and Section V of page 8.
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6.2. A Note on Modelling the Intruder
Due to the assumptions on the nature of the intruder in [1], the intruder
in this paper is assumed to be another participant in the protocol with a well-
known identity (through the use of certificates) and who is only able to divert
the protocol via messages that make sense to other participants. The use of
secure communications in the protocol prevents external intruders, who are
not participating actively in the protocol, from interfering with the protocol
messages. This assumption yields the intruder less powerful than Dolev-
Yao’s most powerful attacker [9, 10], since for example, we do not assume
that the intruder is capable of listening passively to communications among
other participants or injecting data into the exchanged messages without
participating in a protocol session.
Therefore, the only case where we model an intruder is that of α3, in
which the delegatee is assumed to run some extra “malicious” code in order
to exploit the repudiation vulnerability in the protocol. Apart from that, the
delegatee is not assumed to be running any other malicious behaviour. For
both of the other cases of α2 and α4, the vulnerabilities are related to the
correct functionality of the protocol as claimed in [1], which are independent
of the model of the attacker adopted.
7. DToken II: The Corrected Version
We now propose a new version of the DToken protocol, which does not
suffer from any of the above vulnerabilities in the original protocol. The
protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Dor→ Dee : RfDDor
2. Dee→ Dor : |{DSDor→Dee,RfDDor}|KDee
3. Dor→ Dee : CDor, CDee, Vfr, Vto, TS, PDor→Dee, DSDor→Dee, SigDor→Dee
4. Dee→ Dor : CDor, CDee, Vfr, Vto, TS, PDor→Dee, DSDor→Dee, SigDor→Dee,
SigDee→Dor, CDorCAs
In this corrected version, the delegator commences the protocol by sending
a request for delegation message RfDDor. This messages can be considered
as a negotiation message, which may include description of the delegated
permissions or any other delegation information. If the delegatee accepts
the request, it will reply by proposing the delegation session identifier signed
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with its signature along with the original request from the delegator. In this
manner, both parties will agree on the session identifier hence eliminating
the validation bug in the original protocol. Similarly, since the delegatee has
signed the request and the session identifier, the delegator can now prove the
association between the delegated permissions and the delegation session.
Hence, the delegatee cannot repudiate its acceptance of the session, even
though this is proven outside the structure of the DToken itself.
In order to achieve deterministic delegation chains, we propose that DTo-
kens be passed in a list structure as opposed to the set structure as done in
the original protocol, when performing second and further level delegations.
Hence, for example in Figure 1, we propose that the job queueing system
passes the list [DTU → G; DTG → JQS] instead of passing {DTU → G,
DTG → JQS}. This will ensure that DTokens are ordered in their temporal
sequencing and so no non-determinism arises when building chains.
8. Related Work
The use of tokens for achieving delegation in distributed systems is a
common technique that has been used in many popular systems throughout
the years, such as for example, Kerberos [11]. A recent taxonomy of dele-
gation methods has recently been published in [12], where various types of
delegation tokens and credentials are discussed. Further uses of delegation
tokens in collaborative applications include healthcare [13], identity manage-
ment in service-oriented architectures [14] and in the context of Web-based
social networking [15].
The analysis carried out in this paper is based on a well-established
methodology for formally verifying cryptographic protocols presented in pre-
vious works [2, 3, 4, 5]. In [2], a static analysis was defined for capturing
message-passing communications in cryptographic processes defined in the
language of the spi calculus [16]. The analysis was non-uniform in that it
could distinguish different instances of the newly created names and was
based on the denotational semantics approach. In [4], the same analysis was
extended to PKI-based systems. In [3], a different variation of the analysis
was defined to detect quantitative aspects of security, in particular, the speed
of information leakage in a system. In [5], the same analysis was enhanced
to detect men-in-the-middle attacks by precise timing of communications.
Literature provides several protocols for achieving delegation. In [17], the
security implications when adopting delegation solutions in Grids are consid-
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ered. These implications are discussed in the scope of two delegation schemes
for Grids; delegation chaining and call-back delegations. Another research
work closely related to the DToken protocol is the hierarchical delegation to-
kens architecture and protocols proposed by Ding and Petersen [18]. In this
work, the authors propose a number of delegation protocols based on the
Schnorr signature scheme [19], which are either key-based, identity-based or
a combination of the two.
Not many of these protocols have been formally verified. In [20], the
authors verify the delegation scheme in the SESAME protocol, a compatible
extension version of Kerberos [11], using the Coq theorem prover [21]. In [22],
the authors provide a formalisation of the security of proxy signature schemes
and analyse one such scheme, namely the Kim, Park and Won scheme [23].
9. Conclusion
We presented in this paper a formal verification using static analysis
methods for detecting several vulnerabilities in the DToken delegation proto-
col designed for Grid systems. The analysis revealed that the protocol suffers
from vulnerabilities related to the integrity of its messages, the possibility
of delegation repudiation by agents and the lack of deterministic delegation
chains. Our conclusion regarding the protocol is that it is not suitable for
delegations in scenarios where the delegated permissions refer to stateless
Web services or require the anonymity of the participants. Also, it is limited
by its lack of an essential feature in delegations, i.e. deterministic delegation
chains.
In fact, the method of discovering this last vulnerability raises an inter-
esting question of the precision of the design of a security protocol and indeed
of the design of any system: In [1], the designers of the protocol considered
only the cases of first and second level delegations. These simple cases could
not reveal the problem of the lack of ability of constructing deterministic del-
egation chains, since they are not precise enough with the number of agents
in the system. However, our analysis, which raised the level of precision of
the system by introducing a third level of delegation, was able to reveal the
vulnerability. This raises the need for the integration of robust formal meth-
ods at all stages of the software development cycle, particularly, for those
components of the system that are deemed most critical.
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